Vegas gives you the odds, but I am not a betting man. So I will give you the percentages.

In his time as general manager of the San Francisco 49ers, John Lynch has made 65 selections in the NFL draft. Of those, I count 16 obvious successes (or look-to-be successes), or roughly one in four. Of those 16, 7 have made the Pro Bowl or All-Pro (not including the absurd snubs of Dre Greenlaw and the ascendent Deommodore Lenoir). So about 12% of Lynch's picks have been stars.


However, not all star picks are created equal. In fact, of those 16 successes, over half were taken on Day 3 of the draft. And a third were taken in the 5th round alone.

I have joked for years that Lynch needs to package his 2nd and 3rd round picks and stockpile another seven or eight 5th-rounders. He's found as many All-Pros in the 5th (George Kittle and Talanoa Hufanga) as he has in the 1st (Nick Bosa and Brandon Aiyuk). He's found more potential stars in the 5th (Greenlaw and Lenoir) than in the 1st (Ricky Pearsall). He's found more stars in the 7th (Brock Purdy and Jauan Jennings) than in the 2nd (Deebo Samuel—though Renardo Green looks promising).

In all seriousness, one has to wonder why. Why would his defensive backs in the 5th outperform those he took in the 3rd? Why would the receivers he took in later rounds outperform those taken on the first two days of the draft? And why, oh why, would the face of the franchise turn out to be the quarterback taken with the last pick in the draft and not the quarterback chosen with the 3rd overall selection?

I believe I have the answer.

It comes down to two key concepts: floor versus ceiling and what you can see versus what you can't.


Floor versus ceiling


Pundits like to talk about "safe" draft picks. The player has a very "high floor." On the other hand, another player might have a much higher ceiling, an almost untappable potential. However, the fact of the matter is that the average career of an NFL player is only a few years. That is, most players don't even have a floor. They end up in the trash can in the basement.

Early-round picks are the ceiling picks. Those are the players who (supposedly) transform franchises. The players who make an organization relevant again. And those are the players where GMs repeatedly get it wrong.

Trey Lance was seen as the future because of that potential. A big arm, great speed, and a tough runner. Brock Purdy was seen as a good QB3 who might develop into a serviceable backup. So what happened? How were they so wrong?

What you can see and what you can't


With Trey Lance, it was all about the measurables. The arm strength was undeniable. The athleticism was off the charts. The worry was always that the sample size of playing time was too small, but he exhibited no red flags in his personality or work ethic. He was someone whose talent was visible.

Brock Purdy, on the other hand, does not impress the eyes. His arm is adequate to good. His athleticism is solid. He can make plays with his legs, but no one will call him Lamar or Josh (or Trey). And he is not 6-foot-5. But you can't measure processing speed. You can't measure decision-making or leadership. You can't really measure pocket awareness, though you know it when you see it. Steve Young said Purdy's "superpower is processing," even going so far as to say Purdy "can process better than almost any of them. I would put him up against anybody." So what happened? John Lynch and Kyle Shanahan looked at what they thought was a limited quarterback but who had strong intangibles and took him. Then the intangibles of No. 262 beat the pants off the tangibles of No. 3.


Every year, during the NFL Scouting Combine, a handful of players rocket up draft boards because of their speed. And other players fall because some physical trait is not what teams desire. Wide receiver X or cornerback Y runs a sub-4.4 40-yard dash and is taken in the 1st round, while some lineman's arms are too short or a quarterback's hands are three molecules too small, and the player falls to Round 3.

In 2020, Jalen Reagor ran a very solid 4.47 40 and was taken in the late 1st round. He has never had 400 yards receiving in a season, has four career touchdowns, and is now on his second team.

Jauan Jennings, on the other hand, ran an atrocious 4.72 40 and dropped to the 7th round, where Lynch selected him. Jennings had five touchdowns as a rookie, was just shy of 1,000 yards receiving last season, and is so dependable that a 3rd-and-long play is referred to as "3rd and Jauan." What happened is Lynch looked at the non-measurables, such as toughness, willingness to block (Jennings' blocking makes almost comical highlight reels), and determination, and took a flyer on the kid from the University of Tennessee.

So, come the 5th round and later, I think what happens is John Lynch stops thinking about ceilings. He stops thinking about transcendent, generational players, and he looks at different traits. He looks for intangibles. In the later rounds, there isn't the pressure to justify a pick. There will be no press-conference grilling about why the 17th pick in the 6th round flamed out after a year. There are no distractions to get in the way of what you like about a player who is measurably limited.

And so, Lynch took Kittle in the 5th, he took Warner in a middle round, and he took his quarterback of the future in the 7th. In other words, the players who have transformed the franchise.


In a week, we'll be watching it all unfold. And I am praying Lynch lands a stud with the 11th pick. But I'm telling you, Faithful, you need to tune in on Saturday. That's when, very likely, the future will actually be made.

Written By:

Jack Stewart


Jack Stewart was educated at Alabama and Emory and was a Brittain Fellow at Georgia Tech. His poetry has been published widely in the US and several other countries. His book No Reason was published in the Poeima Poetry Series in 2020.
All articles by Jack Stewart


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