All22 analysis: Red Zone issues

Originally posted by Giedi:
Keep in mind if you are going to read any passing concepts in the red zone you need good pass protection and a QB who can pretty much throw blind. Even rub routs take time to read if they give you a man look and suddenly rotate a zone to the rub route concept side. Point is that defenses like the Ravens and Seadderall will use a lot of pressure schemes to make young QB'S like Colin to be one read and go quarterbacks in the redzone. They don't necessarily blitz all the time but they can slant or dog the defenses to screw up the pass protections. This year's O-line has to do better at pass protection in the redzone if this year's offense wants to improve their red zone performance from last year.

Very good point

On post #140, first down play, note that Goodwin was held from blocking #54 who would have tackled Gore had #91 not tackled him. Boone couldn't get to #54 in time. Also, a bootleg or reverse in this area would be good play calls against Seattle. The defense completely committed to their right side. Kap is by himself to their left. And note that Iupati gets stood up by a CB.

Originally posted by Niners816:

Originally posted by jonnydel:
I agree wholeheartedly from what I've seen on film as well. There's almost an inordinate amount of isolation fade/back shoulder throws which Kap has not shown me a great aptitude for. However, this may be due to a lack of anticipatory throwing on Kap's part - as the red zone requires anticipation because everything is so condensed; and we all know how Harbaugh likes to at least make sure he gets 3 instead of a pick.

This is so true. I know thl408 and I have talked how kaep has shown (not always, but enough to be concerning) the trait of not even looking at the concept side on 3x1 sets. He really seems to love taking the back shoulder/isolated backside. So either he really needs to get better in his fade back shoulder stuff or really start to work the concepts. This is an area I would love to see improvement In.

Could be a design...an AR1 as well, meaning the design itself is used to create isolation which is why CK goes there (seems like), 100% of the time and has noted as such that certain receivers are determined pre snap. B/c the time it takes to go from this isolation receiver all the way back over to the 3-side takes a lot of time and feeds right into a pass rush. Note how there are no real options in the middle of the field usually or any under this read (as a viable 2nd option). Just a thought...

Originally posted by Paul_Hofer:

On post #140, first down play, note that Goodwin was held from blocking #54 who would have tackled Gore had #91 not tackled him. Boone couldn't get to #54 in time. Also, a bootleg or reverse in this area would be good play calls against Seattle. The defense completely committed to their right side. Kap is by himself to their left. And note that Iupati gets stood up by a CB.

Good observation, but I think it also has to do with Goodwins lack of power and quickness to get to the second level. Seadderall likes to slant or gap penetrate their D linemen and if you look at the D Lineman that *held* Goodwin, It looked like he was jumping into the cener Guard gap, but Goodwin was able to cut that off. That did two things, it clogs up any inside run traps and it frees the MLB to flow to the ball carrier. A more powerful center would have been, hopefully, able to push the DT back into the path of the Flowing Linebacker and free up the ball carrier for another couple of yards.

In seadderall's scheme, they have one guy on the D line that is a two gapper and his job is to be a tree stump for the defense. He takes on the responsibility of playing two gaps. Whether that was Red Bryant or Brandon Mebane, the job was to enable the rest of the other D line to one gap - and penetrate that gap - as fast as possible to get into the backfield and disrupt the pass or clog up the run blocking. If we can take out that guy with one of our O linemen, it really puts a kink in their defensive scheme because it forces them to add more defenders in the box and leaving the corners and remaining linebackers more exposed to the pass.

Entire podcast devoted to the RZ topic here: http://www.49erswebzone.com/podcasts/

^^^

Analysis includes the 25 yard-line in as the "red zone."

Check out www.thefootballeducator.com (Jordan Plocher @StarvingScout) for the full-detailed report.

Cliff-notes:

• In 2012, the "move" player (FB/TE) was always where the run play was going (predictable tip-off for the defense).
• In 2013, a lot is similar to 2012; a little bit more passing down the field esp. when Crabtree returned, WR position improved d/t Boldin in the RZ. Huge volume of games and plays to dissect under CK (19 games) and esp. including the difficulty of analyzing d/t the motions and shifts pre-snap and personnel groupings/formations.
• 22 (2 RB's and 2 TE's) personnel stayed predominant even when Crabtree came back (67 total with Crabtree back alone). We had a 70/30 split of run to pass in the RZ from the 22.
• We are about "team focus" of physically beating the defense (Bo Schemblacher philosophy) vs. a team like the Broncos which is predicated on Manning's arm and IQ and picking the most open player. He believes b/c of this more team-oriented focus, it allows for a team friendly contract for the QB and more focus on improving the other 10 guys around him.
• Was reminded of the 1980's re: the large use of the FB and lead blockers and pulling guards.
• Lots of pistol as well and shifts and motions and jumbo packages (6-7 OL). What was their favorite "power" run types? It is varied (will use zone, power, jet sweeps, QB draws, etc.) but the goal is to stretch teams out horizontal and then attack a seam on power runs mostly.
• The preferred WCO pass concept is flooding (3 receivers on one side at 3 levels) but all are close into one quadrant and CK is usually rolling out to that same side (if covered, he then runs).
• Where they effective and more effective in 2012? They were effective although CK's stats were down a bit. Where we got worse was in passing to Crabtree…per the number of attempts we utilized Crabtree, we got little in return in the RZ. They would be way more effective using VD and Boldin. Overall, CK's stats got better when Crabtree returned but the RZ effectiveness dropped once Crabtree came back (surprising).
• The types of routes asked to run by Crabtree were low % plays (i.e. fades, screens, slants under the flood called the Crabtree Special, quick-out routes, etc.). Scheme allows VD to get open more in the middle of the field and on movement/speed. We tried to attack single coverage a lot (see NFCCG INT) and this is not Crabtree's strength. CK has had ZERO production thus far on the fade, back-shoulder, etc. 0 TD's to date and he questioned why we keep trying that route at critical times in critical games when there has been zero production there and b/c it has such a low % success rate (ended our last 2 years).
• Are we going to open up the offense in 2014? Was the 11 personnel as effective as the 22 or 12? He felt 11 was not as effective and plays to CK's weaknesses thus far (i.e. fade routes) even though the 11 personnel was the 2nd most used. The take-away was how amazing VD was b/c he is such a mismatch and can line him up outside, inside, etc.
• Short yardage they tend to use the jumbo packages (6 or 7 OL) and are very effective. The 11 w/o Crabtree was used 1.8 times a game in the RZ of the time but with Crabtree, it was used 3.2. If we want to use 11 more, we should target non-Crabtree targets more and work heavily on improving fade routes. We are much better at passing to VD out wide (better scheme) or pounding the ball inside the 5.
• David & Oscar reiterate opening up the offense does not include utilizing more 3-WR sets per se' but expanding on the route concepts we already run (i.e. using the middle of the field more, more exotic schemes, etc.). In short, if a defense runs a cover 0 all-out blitz, throw a quick slant inside or hit the TE in the middle of the field vacated by defenders.
• Are we predictable? They are predictable re: when we'll run (although it is varied – crazy!) and they know where the run is going still based on the "move" guy mostly. CK is the real X-factor though (will he run or pass?) that makes the RZ offense less predictable.
• The Pistol/read-option formation and how/when they used this was better than 2012 and it dipped when Crabtree came back.
• The RZ TD's declined when Crabtree came back. Part of this was believed to be b/c we were forced to be more exotic in our calls and spread the wealth a bit more between receivers (i.e. less reliant on a Crabtree-centric passing game in the RZ); some was d/t the competition we faced later in the year as well and being a bit more conservative d/t the magnitude of the games. But overall, much too many wasted targets on Crabtree. VD is much more effective than Crabtree OUTSIDE than Crabtree in the RZ (crazy!)
• More issues with execution or play calling? He thinks it's clearly a combination of both. He noted that Roman calls a varied run game in the RZ but a very vanilla passing game (which is his M.O.). Roman also has to recognize tendencies and strengths and weaknesses (ala don't flood to get isolation one side to get Crabtree on an isolation fade route to the corner of the EZ when the game is on the line). Also, use the middle of the field as David and Oscar have highlighted as well. CK also needs to improve as well. We all talked about the use of the check-downs as well.

^^^^great summary.....that 70/30 run bias out of 22 personnel really sticks out. While pass/rush ratio can be skewed for a variety of reasons, 70/30 is way too much of a tell from a specific package. Addressing this aspect could have a positive impact on overall RZ effectiveness.

Originally posted by Niners816:
^^^^great summary.....that 70/30 run bias out of 22 personnel really sticks out. While pass/rush ratio can be skewed for a variety of reasons, 70/30 is way too much of a tell from a specific package. Addressing this aspect could have a positive impact on overall RZ effectiveness.

Thanks.

Agreed! It speaks to probably Roman's strength and confort level as well as probably, his control of play calling in the RZ. Now, I don't know how much that changed when it was alleged that Harbaugh started calling more plays (or all of them) from the game plan late last season but even if not, it does still speak to their Bo Schemblacher approach to offense inside the RZ...power, power and power again!

Originally posted by NCommand:
^^^

Analysis includes the 25 yard-line in as the "red zone."

Check out www.thefootballeducator.com (Jordan Plocher @StarvingScout) for the full-detailed report.

Cliff-notes:

• In 2012, the "move" player (FB/TE) was always where the run play was going (predictable tip-off for the defense).
• In 2013, a lot is similar to 2012; a little bit more passing down the field esp. when Crabtree returned, WR position improved d/t Boldin in the RZ. Huge volume of games and plays to dissect under CK (19 games) and esp. including the difficulty of analyzing d/t the motions and shifts pre-snap and personnel groupings/formations.
  22 (2 RB's and 2 TE's) personnel stayed predominant even when Crabtree came back (67 total with Crabtree back alone). We had a 70/30 split of run to pass in the RZ from the 22.
• We are about "team focus" of physically beating the defense (Bo Schemblacher philosophy) vs. a team like the Broncos which is predicated on Manning's arm and IQ and picking the most open player. He believes b/c of this more team-oriented focus, it allows for a team friendly contract for the QB and more focus on improving the other 10 guys around him.
• Was reminded of the 1980's re: the large use of the FB and lead blockers and pulling guards.
• Lots of pistol as well and shifts and motions and jumbo packages (6-7 OL). What was their favorite "power" run types? It is varied (will use zone, power, jet sweeps, QB draws, etc.) but the goal is to stretch teams out horizontal and then attack a seam on power runs mostly.
• The preferred WCO pass concept is flooding (3 receivers on one side at 3 levels) but all are close into one quadrant and CK is usually rolling out to that same side (if covered, he then runs).
• Where they effective and more effective in 2012? They were effective although CK's stats were down a bit. Where we got worse was in passing to Crabtree…per the number of attempts we utilized Crabtree, we got little in return in the RZ. They would be way more effective using VD and Boldin. Overall, CK's stats got better when Crabtree returned but the RZ effectiveness dropped once Crabtree came back (surprising).
• The types of routes asked to run by Crabtree were low % plays (i.e. fades, screens, slants under the flood called the Crabtree Special, quick-out routes, etc.). Scheme allows VD to get open more in the middle of the field and on movement/speed. We tried to attack single coverage a lot (see NFCCG INT) and this is not Crabtree's strength. CK has had ZERO production thus far on the fade, back-shoulder, etc. 0 TD's to date and he questioned why we keep trying that route at critical times in critical games when there has been zero production there and b/c it has such a low % success rate (ended our last 2 years).
• Are we going to open up the offense in 2014? Was the 11 personnel as effective as the 22 or 12? He felt 11 was not as effective and plays to CK's weaknesses thus far (i.e. fade routes) even though the 11 personnel was the 2nd most used. The take-away was how amazing VD was b/c he is such a mismatch and can line him up outside, inside, etc.
• Short yardage they tend to use the jumbo packages (6 or 7 OL) and are very effective. The 11 w/o Crabtree was used 1.8 times a game in the RZ of the time but with Crabtree, it was used 3.2. If we want to use 11 more, we should target non-Crabtree targets more and work heavily on improving fade routes. We are much better at passing to VD out wide (better scheme) or pounding the ball inside the 5.
• David & Oscar reiterate opening up the offense does not include utilizing more 3-WR sets per se' but expanding on the route concepts we already run (i.e. using the middle of the field more, more exotic schemes, etc.). In short, if a defense runs a cover 0 all-out blitz, throw a quick slant inside or hit the TE in the middle of the field vacated by defenders.
• Are we predictable? They are predictable re: when we'll run (although it is varied – crazy!) and they know where the run is going still based on the "move" guy mostly. CK is the real X-factor though (will he run or pass?) that makes the RZ offense less predictable.
• The Pistol/read-option formation and how/when they used this was better than 2012 and it dipped when Crabtree came back.
• The RZ TD's declined when Crabtree came back. Part of this was believed to be b/c we were forced to be more exotic in our calls and spread the wealth a bit more between receivers (i.e. less reliant on a Crabtree-centric passing game in the RZ); some was d/t the competition we faced later in the year as well and being a bit more conservative d/t the magnitude of the games. But overall, much too many wasted targets on Crabtree. VD is much more effective than Crabtree OUTSIDE than Crabtree in the RZ (crazy!)
• More issues with execution or play calling? He thinks it's clearly a combination of both. He noted that Roman calls a varied run game in the RZ but a very vanilla passing game (which is his M.O.). Roman also has to recognize tendencies and strengths and weaknesses (ala don't flood to get isolation one side to get Crabtree on an isolation fade route to the corner of the EZ when the game is on the line). Also, use the middle of the field as David and Oscar have highlighted as well. CK also needs to improve as well. We all talked about the use of the check-downs as well.

Thank you so much for that summary. I'm listening to it now, but that was very nice to have a 70 minute podcast available in bullet points.

I do notice that the passing concepts become simplified in the RZ. We can all see that in the cut ups. I think there are two reasons for this. One could be that Jim gets conservative in the RZ and doesn't want a turnover - he doesn't trust his QB. Because of that, the second reason is that Jim wants to give Kap simple reads (play action to VD, backs shoulder fade on a WR isolation) because windows are so much tighter and Kap just isn't quick enough and isn't using enough anticipation to throw into tight windows in the RZ. This will improve in due time, but last season it was not up to snuff.

The reason for the lopsided 70/30 run/pass split is by design to make the play action more effective. There were a number of easy throws to VD in the end zone where he was wide open. This is due to running 70%. The few times they passed out of 22, they wanted it to be a "surprise". And it worked a number of times.

Originally posted by thl408:

Thank you so much for that summary. I'm listening to it now, but that was very nice to have a 70 minute podcast available in bullet points.

I do notice that the passing concepts become simplified in the RZ. We can all see that in the cut ups. I think there are two reasons for this. One could be that Jim gets conservative in the RZ and doesn't want a turnover - he doesn't trust his QB. Because of that, the second reason is that Jim wants to give Kap simple reads (play action to VD, backs shoulder fade on a WR isolation) because windows are so much tighter and Kap just isn't quick enough and isn't using enough anticipation to throw into tight windows in the RZ. This will improve in due time, but last season it was not up to snuff.

The reason for the lopsided 70/30 run/pass split is by design to make the play action more effective. There were a number of easy throws to VD in the end zone where he was wide open. This is due to running 70%. The few times they passed out of 22, they wanted it to be a "surprise". And it worked a number of times.

Regarding the ratio, I wonder now if even a slight shift approaching 40/60 could result in just a few more yards/first downs. My thinking is that we have shown that huge bias and I think we have an opportunity to exploit it now. I just think there could be some explosion play opportunities given our heavy run bias in 22.

It's just my opinion but I feel like 30/70 is too much of a tell and you can get the same effect by using something closer to 40/60.

I guess as I write this, I wonder what it was when delanie was on the squad. Perhaps braking in a new TE had something to do with the drastic split.

I'm at the point where they (pod casters) challenged listeners to name a time where Kap threw a fade for a touchdown. Then went on to say they "watch a lot of game tape". We can go and tell them this happened.

Originally posted by thl408:

I'm at the point where they (pod casters) challenged listeners to name a time where Kap threw a fade for a touchdown. Then went on to say they "watch a lot of game tape". We can go and tell them this happened.

The first Td illustrates a situation where I love the fade route. I just think there would be an opportunity to run this type a play a few more times over the course of a year.

Originally posted by Niners816:

Originally posted by thl408:
Thank you so much for that summary. I'm listening to it now, but that was very nice to have a 70 minute podcast available in bullet points.

I do notice that the passing concepts become simplified in the RZ. We can all see that in the cut ups. I think there are two reasons for this. One could be that Jim gets conservative in the RZ and doesn't want a turnover - he doesn't trust his QB. Because of that, the second reason is that Jim wants to give Kap simple reads (play action to VD, backs shoulder fade on a WR isolation) because windows are so much tighter and Kap just isn't quick enough and isn't using enough anticipation to throw into tight windows in the RZ. This will improve in due time, but last season it was not up to snuff.

The reason for the lopsided 70/30 run/pass split is by design to make the play action more effective. There were a number of easy throws to VD in the end zone where he was wide open. This is due to running 70%. The few times they passed out of 22, they wanted it to be a "surprise". And it worked a number of times.

Regarding the ratio, I wonder now if even a slight shift approaching 40/60 could result in just a few more yards/first downs. My thinking is that we have shown that huge bias and I think we have an opportunity to exploit it now. I just think there could be some explosion play opportunities given our heavy run bias in 22.

It's just my opinion but I feel like 30/70 is too much of a tell and you can get the same effect by using something closer to 40/60.

I guess as I write this, I wonder what it was when delanie was on the squad. Perhaps braking in a new TE had something to do with the drastic split.

(I may have got confused when you mentioned explosive plays out of 22.) It's a 30/70 split in the redzone when in 22 personnel (according to the podcast). When VD is wide open in the end zone, that's when the 30/70 split paid off. I'd go for a 40/60 split while keeping in mind that the Gore did have a lot of short TD runs from the 22 grouping.

The two huge TD bombs (ARI game 1, TB) to VD were out of 22 using play action. Those are the explosion plays I think of when you mentioned the possibility of more explosive plays.

Originally posted by thl408:

(I may have got confused when you mentioned explosive plays out of 22.) It's a 30/70 split in the redzone when in 22 personnel (according to the podcast). When VD is wide open in the end zone, that's when the 30/70 split paid off. I'd go for a 40/60 split while keeping in mind that the Gore did have a lot of short TD runs from the 22 grouping.

The two huge TD bombs (ARI game 1, TB) to VD were out of 22 using play action. Those are the explosion plays I think of when you mentioned the possibility of more explosive plays.

Yea that is sort of my thinking. I admit I get too wrapped up in ratio splits, but I just feel when you are getting over 40/60 split either way(exceptions being inches to go situations), you are neglecting the other side too much.

I love those Playaction explosion plays you mentioned, but I also feel like that first fade you showed out of 22 vs NO is an explosion play in the context of the redzone.

Originally posted by NCommand:

^^^

Analysis includes the 25 yard-line in as the "red zone."

Check out www.thefootballeducator.com (Jordan Plocher @StarvingScout) for the full-detailed report.

Cliff-notes:

• In 2012, the "move" player (FB/TE) was always where the run play was going (predictable tip-off for the defense).
• In 2013, a lot is similar to 2012; a little bit more passing down the field esp. when Crabtree returned, WR position improved d/t Boldin in the RZ. Huge volume of games and plays to dissect under CK (19 games) and esp. including the difficulty of analyzing d/t the motions and shifts pre-snap and personnel groupings/formations.
  22 (2 RB's and 2 TE's) personnel stayed predominant even when Crabtree came back (67 total with Crabtree back alone). We had a 70/30 split of run to pass in the RZ from the 22.
• We are about "team focus" of physically beating the defense (Bo Schemblacher philosophy) vs. a team like the Broncos which is predicated on Manning's arm and IQ and picking the most open player. He believes b/c of this more team-oriented focus, it allows for a team friendly contract for the QB and more focus on improving the other 10 guys around him.
• Was reminded of the 1980's re: the large use of the FB and lead blockers and pulling guards.
• Lots of pistol as well and shifts and motions and jumbo packages (6-7 OL). What was their favorite "power" run types? It is varied (will use zone, power, jet sweeps, QB draws, etc.) but the goal is to stretch teams out horizontal and then attack a seam on power runs mostly.
• The preferred WCO pass concept is flooding (3 receivers on one side at 3 levels) but all are close into one quadrant and CK is usually rolling out to that same side (if covered, he then runs).
• Where they effective and more effective in 2012? They were effective although CK's stats were down a bit. Where we got worse was in passing to Crabtree…per the number of attempts we utilized Crabtree, we got little in return in the RZ. They would be way more effective using VD and Boldin. Overall, CK's stats got better when Crabtree returned but the RZ effectiveness dropped once Crabtree came back (surprising).
• The types of routes asked to run by Crabtree were low % plays (i.e. fades, screens, slants under the flood called the Crabtree Special, quick-out routes, etc.). Scheme allows VD to get open more in the middle of the field and on movement/speed. We tried to attack single coverage a lot (see NFCCG INT) and this is not Crabtree's strength. CK has had ZERO production thus far on the fade, back-shoulder, etc. 0 TD's to date and he questioned why we keep trying that route at critical times in critical games when there has been zero production there and b/c it has such a low % success rate (ended our last 2 years).
• Are we going to open up the offense in 2014? Was the 11 personnel as effective as the 22 or 12? He felt 11 was not as effective and plays to CK's weaknesses thus far (i.e. fade routes) even though the 11 personnel was the 2nd most used. The take-away was how amazing VD was b/c he is such a mismatch and can line him up outside, inside, etc.
• Short yardage they tend to use the jumbo packages (6 or 7 OL) and are very effective. The 11 w/o Crabtree was used 1.8 times a game in the RZ of the time but with Crabtree, it was used 3.2. If we want to use 11 more, we should target non-Crabtree targets more and work heavily on improving fade routes. We are much better at passing to VD out wide (better scheme) or pounding the ball inside the 5.
• David & Oscar reiterate opening up the offense does not include utilizing more 3-WR sets per se' but expanding on the route concepts we already run (i.e. using the middle of the field more, more exotic schemes, etc.). In short, if a defense runs a cover 0 all-out blitz, throw a quick slant inside or hit the TE in the middle of the field vacated by defenders.
• Are we predictable? They are predictable re: when we'll run (although it is varied – crazy!) and they know where the run is going still based on the "move" guy mostly. CK is the real X-factor though (will he run or pass?) that makes the RZ offense less predictable.
• The Pistol/read-option formation and how/when they used this was better than 2012 and it dipped when Crabtree came back.
• The RZ TD's declined when Crabtree came back. Part of this was believed to be b/c we were forced to be more exotic in our calls and spread the wealth a bit more between receivers (i.e. less reliant on a Crabtree-centric passing game in the RZ); some was d/t the competition we faced later in the year as well and being a bit more conservative d/t the magnitude of the games. But overall, much too many wasted targets on Crabtree. VD is much more effective than Crabtree OUTSIDE than Crabtree in the RZ (crazy!)
• More issues with execution or play calling? He thinks it's clearly a combination of both. He noted that Roman calls a varied run game in the RZ but a very vanilla passing game (which is his M.O.). Roman also has to recognize tendencies and strengths and weaknesses (ala don't flood to get isolation one side to get Crabtree on an isolation fade route to the corner of the EZ when the game is on the line). Also, use the middle of the field as David and Oscar have highlighted as well. CK also needs to improve as well. We all talked about the use of the check-downs as well.

The HaRoman offense has had redzone problems since the Alex smith days. I think I've beaten to death Colin needing to improve, Goodwin needing to be replaced, and Vance also needing to improve.

Bruce miller, Hyde, the two Martins and Lattimore will play a role in improving the redzone offense.

Having said that -- Scheme - wise I just don't think the offense deals very well with extreme coverages, whether it be zero coverage or 8 dropping back. Somehow I think a three tight end set should be incorporated in the rezone offense. It's a good formation to run or play - pass out of. Specially if we run 70% in the red zone. Also I think it's very difficult for defenses to keep track of personnel substitutions - like if the suddenly we go 3 WR or 3 o-linemen. The WR's can run the TE routs and the tight ends can run the WR routes and it's just a matter of running the particular pass play that matches up with a particular red zone defense.

In the case of zero coverage, a guy like vance, stevie or ellington can run an ally oop or a post up route against the defender. In the case of 8 men dropping back, everybody blocks and Colin runs and slides down before he takes a hit. (As an example of a Infante route adjustment)

In other words - those plays are built in *scheme-wise* to deal with extreme coverages that have been *historically* problematic for the team. So in addition to improving our redzone personnel, an analysis should be made as to what defenses have given our redzone offense trouble and install counter measures directly in the scheme to deal with them. DC's aren't stupid. They will play defenses that historically give an offense problems. So, in my opinion, the HaRoman offense should deal with those situations with schemes built in from day one In TC, so by the time regular season is here those adjustments are automatic.